

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Superpowers Influence in the Horn of Africa		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) BRIG Benjamin M. Nganda		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 19 May 89
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 75
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION, DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This paper is an attempt to combine historical, social and political variables which make up the regional system that is the Horn of Africa. This work presents an evaluation and analysis that throws some light into events and external intrusions which contribute to the situation as it generally exists today. The region is viewed from four perspectives--internal aspects, regional linkages, strategic and a historical interpretation. These four are integrated to form an influential consideration and conclusions regarding the region and the potential areas of conflict or cooperation between those involved		

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SUPERPOWERS INFLUENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
19 May 1989



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AUTHOR: Benjamin M. Nganda, BRIG, IN

TITLE: Superpowers Influence in the Horn of Africa

FORMAT: An Individual Study Project

DATE: 19 May 1989 PAGES: 76 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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SUPERPOWERS INFLUENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Geography is the force which has caused international concern with the Horn of Africa. Because of their location the countries which make up the Horn are involved in the political realities of the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and of course Africa. Oil from the Middle East to Africa, Europe and Japan and the flow of commerce between East Africa, Asia and the Gulf must pass near the Somalia Coast, through the Straits of the Bab-el-Mandeb and along the coast of Ethiopia en route to the Suez Canal. Naturally the ability to monitor the traffic and to conduct military operations against targets on the sea lanes from coastal ports and airfields on the Horn has occupied the minds of many strategists. Not surprisingly, these capabilities have been the genesis of much of the external involvement in the area. Of equal if not greater importance is the significance of the Horn as a springboard into Central and Southern Africa, the oil rich Arabian peninsula and the sensitive area of Sudan, Egypt and Libya.

The events of 1977 have resulted in a need to reevaluate critically long standing notions about the Horn. The continuing conflict between the two principal regional actors, namely Ethiopia and Somali, and the Eritrean situation have impacted not only on the United States policy and strategies in the region, but have resulted in grave concern in bordering states where the United States has interests. The other important factor in dealing with the Horn issues is the consideration of the reversement of the Ethiopians and the Somalis and the introduction of the Soviet and Cuban military forces and hardware. This has attracted the interests of the Arab and African worlds, the introduction of additional actors, and the concomitant conflict between

previously clear interests and strategies which creates a situation of potential great danger for stability in a region contiguous with the already super critical Middle East.

Most studies relative to the Horn, its actors and their relationships with the rest of the world tend to fall into three categories, pure history, social anthropology, and political science. This statement is probably true of studies done on any region or state and itself is unremarkable, yet a closer examination of the work on the Horn reveals a major shortcoming. The fact is that although some work has been done on the region, there have been few attempts to combine all three aspects together in order to obtain a complete picture. Rough history has been written covering the period up to 1960. The sociologist or anthropologist usually looks at a small section of the region without much regard for the remainder, and most political analysts seem to think that the Horn of Africa emerged from the ocean in 1945. The possible exception to the rule is Richard Greenfield, whose work, Ethiopia - A New Political History, has become a classic. This writer seemed to feel a need for a new approach in analyzing the major political entity on the Horn. He points out that:

Ethiopia is an ancient country and no attempt to understand its complicated internal politics and the motivations of the several groups and interests involved could even begin without some examination of their roots. Since Ethiopia was not affected by the colonial era in the same way as the rest of Africa, extend far back into the history and mythology of that land. For this reason the emphasis of his book is bound to differ from those adopted in studies of other African nations.¹

Greenfield was speaking of Ethiopia but with a few word substitutions he could have been describing the entire Horn of Africa. His analysis stops as of 1960; and therefore it is in that spirit this work is attempted.

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

A review of the literature relating to the Horn of Africa reveals that there are many useful works which examine individual countries, but only a few which treat the region as a whole. Of these, the late Dr. Tom Farer's War Clouds On the Horn of Africa² is the most recent and probably the best of an unexceptional series of English language work. This book written before the Ethiopia-Somali conflict, examines the Horn from a geographical perspective in an attempt to develop some policy recommendations for the United States. While Dr. Farer's analysis was excellent, his conclusion that the United States would support the Ethiopians and the Soviet Union the Somalis in a contest for the Horn, were considerably off the mark.

A plethora of works have been published on Ethiopia with the principal ones being of general value. Of note are Greenfield, Edward Ullendorff's The Ethiopians and Richard Pankhurst's contribution is another classic, an extremely readable social anthropological look at Ethiopia. Unfortunately he does not examine political and social problems. Pankhurst's volume is a compendium of facts, primarily economic data but includes a number of social and historical insights about Ethiopia up to 1935. He also talks on Somalia and the Horn in general. The leading authority on Somalia is I. M. Lewis whose books, A Pastoral Democracy and A Modern History of Somaliland and numerous articles, have developed the idea of Somali nationhood. He is well supplemented by Saadia Touval's, Somali Nationalism. There are several others that do not fit the subject of this research.

OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH

As related above, there have been few attempts to combine the historical, social and political variables which make up the regional system that is the

Horn of Africa. This effort is an attempt to present an encapsulated analysis that will provide a complete picture of attitudes, events and external intrusions which have contributed to the situation as it exists today. Given the constraints of time and space, this study will focus on the following:

- o What was the origin of the Ethiopia-Somali disputes on the Horn and what are the salient factors in the continuing hostilities?
- o What are the influences, interests and policy objectives of the actors, especially the superpowers?
- o What areas of possible conflict and cooperation can be ascertained between the involved actors, and what recommendations can be derived from them for the future of this vital region?

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

The main focus of this paper is upon internal trends in Ethiopia and Somalia; and upon the impact and influence of the superpowers whose intrusion into the region has tended to exacerbate already extant prejudices and accelerate the forces of change and fissiparous tendencies. Initially an historical analysis will be used to enable the reader to identify the salient variables in the relationship among the actors and the effect of premordialism and change on the regional actors. From this point one shall undertake more detailed analysis and evaluation of the interests and objectives of the external actors, and will then make an attempt to identify areas of potential conflict or cooperation. Finally, conclusions and recommendations as appropriate will be offered.

Threaded throughout the discussion will be observations on the impact of technology and situational factors on the cultures of the Horn. Much of this study will be influenced by personal observations and experiences due to my

own familiarity with the area as a Kenyan whose national security interests are directly involved. The Horn of Africa has, does and will play an active and crucial political role, not only in Africa, but in the international system. It is hoped that this paper can in some small measure add some light to policymakers with a perspective in planning for future.

ENDNOTES

1. Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 2.
2. Tom Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa.

CHAPTER II

THE REGION, ITS PEOPLE AND MODERN BACKGROUND

The Horn enjoys a special status on the continent of Africa. It is neither North Africa with Arab Mediterranean orientation, Middle Eastern with its Hellenic influence, nor is it Black Africa with the greatest struggles for independence from colonial rule. This is a region which has absorbed aspects of culture, religion, historical, experience, language and values from all three contiguous areas and from Europe and Asia as well.

In its long history the Horn of Africa has always formed a bridge between Africa and Asia, and has always occupied a favored place at a crossroads of civilization and meeting point of many races.¹

The political subdivisions on the Horn include Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan. Only two of the main actors will be discussed in some detail in this presentation. The physical geography of the region is a microcosm of the topography of Africa. Nearly as large as western Europe, the Horn is a vast spearhead which juts out into the Indian Ocean forming the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden. See Map 1, Annex A.

The major physical feature on the Horn is the Ethiopian Massif which rises to attitudes of 15,000 feet in the north and central parts of Ethiopia. The plateau, as these rugged mountains are sometimes called, is bifurcated by the Great Rift Valley which splits the Horn roughly in two. These two disruptions of the earth's surface have made the central portions of the Horn one of the most isolated and least known spots in Africa.

The northern mouth of the Great Rift Valley contains the Dana Kils Plains. The stretch of desert runs along the coast of the Red Sea and at points drops 381 feet below sea level. Less than forty miles away and paralleling this arid plain are the mountains of the northern half of the Massif, the Amhara

plateau, which rise to 6,700 feet. The citadel effect of this escarpment is well known and often referred to as a reason for the survival of the Ethiopian Empire.² To the West the Massif falls off in a series of terraces and carries down to the Sudanese plain. The gorge of the Blue Nile winds its spectacular way through this broken country to Khartown. On the East (see Map 2 of the Horn depicting highlands, Great Rift Valley and Danakil Plains--Annex B) and South the descent from the southern plateau is not so precipitous as it slides rather gradually down from the Somali plateau. This is a region of typical African veld, a hot area which traditionally supports the livestock of the nomadic herders that cross it in a never ending search for water and graze. Scattered throughout the Horn are concentrations of dense tropical jungle and forested areas.

Temperature and vegetation are used by inhabitants to designate climatic zones. For example the daga refers to the cold zone where the region is alpine in nature, averaging 8,000 feet above the sea level, and the maximum temperature seldom exceeds 60 degrees in the hottest months. In the temperature zone called Wayna-dega, temperatures average about 70 degrees, and it is in this zone that the rich agricultural areas are found. The K'olla includes the veld desert and the badlands. Its literal translation is hot and Somalia in its entirety falls within this zone.

In short, the physical geography of the Horn of Africa contains representative examples of virtually every type of climatological and geographical phenomena found elsewhere in Africa, with the exception of permanent snowfields in the high peaks.

THE PEOPLE

Just as the topography and climate of the Horn are varied, so too are its people. As each of the regional actors is discussed in the pages that

follow, ethnic and linguistic differences will become apparent. In Ethiopia alone, over seventy languages and two hundred dialects are spoken and there are at least nine major ethnic groups.³ A study of all the groups which inhabit the region of the Horn would occupy many more pages than are available in this research.

Generally the two major types of people that predominate are the cultivator of the highlands and the nomadic herdsman of the low plains. The former category includes the descendants of a semetic people which invaded the Horn from the Arab peninsula around 1000 B.C. The Amhara and Tigre elites of Ethiopia are representative of this group. The Somali tribes on the other hand, typify the nomadic warriors of the Savanna and desert. Situated between the two and intermingled to some extent are the largest single ethnic group on the Horn, the Galla (oromo) peoples. This group in the middle are the descendants of purely African group which moved into the Horn some four hundred years ago. Originally probably nomadic, they have tended to adopt the life style of the region they inhabit and therefore are divided between a nomadic and settled existence. A similar dichotomy exists in Sudan where the northern tribes, Arabacised descendants of the Nubians of old, and the southern groups. A mixture of several hundred black African tribes who still remember the depredations of Arab and Abyssinian slave raiders.

In addition to classification by means of subsistence, the people of the Horn can be categorized by religion. The cultivators/warriors of the highlands tend to hold to the rite of the Ethiopian Coptic church and see themselves as the defenders of a Christian island in a Moslem sea. The roving nomads found Islam to be the religion best suited to their needs and throughout history have followed the call of Jihad for the conversion of the pagan and Christian elements. Finally, among the Galla and small scattered

ethnic groups can be found large numbers of pagans and rapidly diminishing groups of Falasha Jews. Moreover, it should be noted that each ethnic group has its own religious minority, i.e. there are nomadic Christians and Moslem farmers, but as a general rule the classification holds; in any event, throughout its history the factors of ethnicity, geography, culture and religion have generated conflict and instability on the Horn.

ENDNOTES

1. Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopia, p. 23.
2. Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia The Modernization of Autocracy, p. 7.
3. George A. Lipsky, Ethiopia. p. 34.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Menelik's influence on the Horn is enormous. According to Richard Greenfield:

In its extent, its government and its problems, present day Ethiopia is largely the creation of the Emperor Menelik II. The process dating from long before his assumption of the imperial crown began as the expansion of the southern kingdom, now province of Shewa of which he was negus. Interpretation of Menelik's expansionist policy vary widely. Not only are they something of political issue, for the Somali republic views Menelik's II as a participator in the scramble for Africa, but scholars also disagree. The author inclines to the view that Menelik was motivated in part by the desire to occupy as many areas as possible before they were seized by the imperialist powers of Europe and his action were, therefore to some extent a response to the scramble for Africa. However, the fact remains that between 1872 and 1898 the territory which Menelik ruled was more than double in area.¹

His participation therefore resulted in the demarcation of boundaries and spheres of influence on the Horn. It has been argued that since Menelik's time the pattern of alliance and the nature of conflict in the region have had some basis in the nationalistic aspirations of the states inhabiting these disputed boundaries. Virtually all of the boundaries in the Horn were established during or just after Menelik's reign, and so it is appropriate at this point to examine the political geography of the Horn as it existed at that time. Ethiopia is central to the Horn, and as a result it shares borders with all the states of the region. It is from this Ethiopian perspective that the political geography is most clearly perceived.

As discussed previously the Ethiopian heartland shifted from Tigre-Eritrea to Lasta, Gondar and finally to Shoa as a result of the pressures of Islam and Menelik's preoccupation with the southern regions. The Italian occupation of Eritrea and the Treaty of Addis Ababa, after Adowa, resulted in a formalized

border running roughly along the present provincial boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This demarcation strengthened the sense of separate identity already felt by the Eritreans.² In Somalia the British first established a protectorate in 1884 and by 1887 they had declared the establishment of a British Somaliland in the North. The Italians concluded formal treaties with the Somali Sultan as well. They began to expand inland across the coastal belt into the Somali plateau. By 1905 the area was known as Italian Somaliland in southern Somalia.

The British and Italians agreed upon borders between their respective Somalilands and also the Somaliland-Kenya border in 1891. The later was further reviewed in favor of the Italians in order to obtain Italy's withdrawal from the central powers in World War I. Formal recognition of the border came about 1925.

The border between Ethiopia and the two Somalilands was established in the same manner in 1894, i.e. agreement between the British and Italians without the consultation with either the Somalis or Ethiopians, both of whom were to challenge the boundaries. In 1908 Ethiopia and Italy agreed upon a new demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The only two maps showing the new boundary were subsequently lost and the border has been in dispute ever since.³

The frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan was established in 1902. This border, the longest common border in Africa, has been the scene of serious tensions. Although mutually recognized, both parties have historically been troubled by hostile groups operating from sanctuary in the other's country.⁴ The border with Kenya was demarcated in colonial times but was not recognized until 1963. This border is also contested by the Somalis who claim a portion of the northeastern Kenya as Somali territory.⁵

With Ethiopia surrounded by hostile or colonizing powers for the second time in her history, and considering the desire of those powers to reap the benefit of additional colonies (as well as avenging a shameful defeat in the case of the Italians), it is not surprising that conflict would continue to characterize the Horn. The only surprise is that it took as long as it did to return.

ENDNOTES

1. Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 96.
2. Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, p. 24.
3. I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somaliland, p. 89-90.
4. Kaplan, et al, Area Hand Book for Ethiopia, p. 315.
5. Kaplan, et al, Area Hand Book for Somalia, p. 174-175.

CHAPTER IV
ITALIAN IMPACT

ETHIOPIA

On the death of Menelik in 1913, Ethiopia was racked by civil war and disorder. During this period of turmoil his designated successor LIJ (Prince) Eyasu embraced Islam and declared Ethiopia to be in the sphere of the Ottoman Empire. The Shoan nobles, however, proclaimed Zauditu, Menelik's daughter, Empress and Ras Tafari Makonen regent and heir presumptive. LIJ Eyasu was excommunicated from the church and, after a brief civil disturbance, his supporters were overpowered by the forces of the Empress. The Muslim Negus died in prison in 1935.¹

Ras Tafari Makonen began to build his forces and milked his province of Harar for revenues until he was in a position to make a bid for control of the government. The death of the aged Foreign Minister, Fitwary Habta Giorgis, provided him with the opportunity he needed. He moved his forces from Harar to Addis Ababa and assumed command of the army, and therefore, the government. In 1928 he was crowned Negus and was exercising direct rule while the empress had been reduced to a mere figurehead. The takeover was not without bloodshed. The old empress attempted to rally her followers, the foremost of which was Ras Gugsa Wolie of Gondar. Tafari's Army destroyed his forces on 31 March 1930. The next day the Empress Zanditu died of uncertain causes. Immediately after a period of mourning Ras Tafari Makonen became Hailie Salassie I Negus Negast.²

The new emperor's ambition was the modernization of his empire. Yet, due to the recalcitrance of his Rases, which in Gojam and Tigre actually led to revolt, much of his time was spent in consolidating power and coopting his

opposition largely through gaining the support of the church. His most significant achievements during his first five years as emperor were: (1) the first constitution, (2) the development of a bureaucracy, (3) the abolition of slavery, (4) the beginnings of a modernization of the army, and perhaps most important, (5) the beginning of an educated class of Ethiopia. All was not well however, for while it seemed that Haile Salassie had a firm hand on the rudder of the state in 1935, others were casting covetous eyes on the helm. The interest of the great powers, particularly Italy, had been diverted (but not ended) by World War I. In fact they began to court Ethiopia on the surface. Ethiopia's entry to the League of Nations was supported by Italy, and a Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1923 and again in 1928. These apparently friendly acts were designed to achieve the economic and political penetration of Ethiopia.

Not until 1934 however, did the right set of circumstances arise. While it is not within the limits of this paper to exam those events in detail, it is sufficient to know that on 5 December, 1934 a skirmish at a place called Watwal is said by some to have been the opening round of World War II. Fighting which broke out between an Italian garrison squatting deep inside Ethiopian territory and an Ethiopian force which was escorting a boundary commission left over 130 Somali and Ethiopian soldiers dead around the wells at Wal-Wal. Both countries lodged immediate complaints with the League of Nations, but the league procrastinated while the British and the French hesitated (they were afraid of driving Italy in the arms of Hitler's Germany). The Ethiopians placed their trust in the emperor who in turn placed his faith in the League of Nations. In the meantime the Italians began to build up forces in Somalia and Eritrea. In 1935 the Italians attacked Ethiopia from Eritrea and Somali and defeated the emperor who fled to England. The

following year Ethiopia was proclaimed a part of the Italian Empire. Most nations were preoccupied by the events in Europe between the periods 1936 through 1941, and no other country knew what the Italians were doing in the Horn of Africa.

Italy's new constitution for Italian East Africa brought Ethiopia, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea together with the whole divided into six provinces. Political power was in the hands of the Italian Army and the Fascist Party who exercised it through their surrogate Somalis, Eritreans and occasionally Ethiopians. Mussolini recognized that years would be required before Ethiopia could make a return on capital invested in her, but there were many people willing to take the gamble.

Italy invested heavily in Ethiopia from 1937 to 1940 and over 300,000 settlers and entrepreneurs emigrated there. According to Italian Government figures there were in excess of 5,000 professionals and shopkeepers. Total private investments was over three billion lire at a time when the average wages in Italy were forty-five liras a week. During the five year occupation, 5,000 km of road, 25 hospitals, schools, municipal buildings, bridges, and prisons were constructed. Also the harbors at Massawa and Assab were improved and aviation facilities built. Agricultural innovations and equipment were introduced in these areas firmly under Italian control and improvements in output were rapid in coming. Nearly every work on Ethiopia dealing with this period comments on the tremendous investment made by the Italians in Ethiopia and on the rapid construction of an infrastructure that would have taken the Ethiopians themselves much longer to do. However, it is generally overlooked that all this work was not done out of a desire to improve the lot of the Ethiopians, but rather to compliment the exploitation of the country. It was Italian development, not Ethiopian development. The fact that the work done

by the Italians was to prove of great value in later modernization does not excuse exploitation nor compensate for the calculated terror of the occupation.

Although the Italians declared Ethiopia under their control in 1936, at no time did they govern the entire countryside. The policy that all rebels captured were to be shot and the energy with which it was implemented generated resistance groups which called themselves Abannoch (Patriots). Many of the Abannoch leaders were captured and executed but a number of them survived to be rewarded with positions of authority in the new empire after the war.³ Of a more sinister character was the calculated attempt on the part of the Italians to liquidate whole influence groups. This policy of selective extermination had its roots in the assassination attempt on Marshal Graziani, the King of Italy's viceroy in Ethiopia. Although the attempt failed, a series of reprisals were made--estimates of the victims of those reprisals run as high as 30,000 in a three day massacre in Addis Ababa alone, the lowest estimate being 1,400. Graziani became obsessed with hatred and saw enemies everywhere. Unable to trace his would be assassins he took advantage of the opportunity to liquidate the entire Ethiopian intelligentsia, every member of the young Ethiopian Party, and all officers and cadets of the military academy. He also ordered the execution of large numbers of clergy--at Debra Libanos alone over 300 monks and priests were shot out of hand. Graziani's own words best illustrate the cold-bloodedness of the Italian policy in Ethiopia as contrasted with their earlier approach in Eritrea and Somalia. He said:

Extermination of all Amhara chiefs, great and small must be speeded up, for if this is not done we can only expect further trouble. As well as chiefs all Amhara military commanders and officials must be executed, none to be spared out of feelings of false pity. The Duce shall have

Ethiopia with or without the Ethiopians, just as he pleases.⁴

Finally even Mussolini realized that events were out of control and in November 1937 Graziani was replaced by the Duke of Aosta, a cultured and humane man, but the damage had already been done and the Duke faced increased resistance. The people had become convinced that the Italians meant to exterminate them. This fear was reinforced by the seemingly insane attacks on the church. In fact the attacks were part of a coldly calculated plan whereby the Italians were attempting to widen ethnic and religious cleavages in a sort of divide and rule policy. Their actions were designed to favor the predominant Galls and Moslem groups at the expense of the Amhara and Christian Amhara and some members of other ethnic groups which had the blessing and support of the church. To counter this resistance the Italians formed a Black Army of Tigre, Eritrean and Somali troops and upon their deployment a climate of civil war was created with further widened the cleavages.

In 1941 the emperor returned to Addis Ababa after heavy fighting with the help of the British who destroyed the presence of the Italians. This is viewed as the intention or wish of the British to impose a mandate over the entire Horn of Africa. The emperor, largely through personal audacity and the help of Churchill, was able to thwart the desires of the field commanders as far as Ethiopia proper was concerned. The British did however, retain control of the Haud and Ogaden regions, as well as the former Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

SOMALIA

In Somalia, prior to the arrival of the Italian and the British, there had never been an institutionalized government. Tribal resistance began

immediately in those areas where the population came into contact with the colonizers. The Italians practiced the game of putting one clan against another and also took advantage of such religious cleavages that already existed. The British followed their normal pattern of indirect rule and did not impact seriously on the Somali culture. A religious revival gave rise to one of Somalia's great heroes during the early years. The Mullah, Mohammed Ibn Abdullah Hassan, fought against the British, Italians, Ethiopians and any Somali who was not of his religious order. The rebellion lasted twenty-one years and required the combined efforts of Britain, Italy and Ethiopia to put it down. It is not intended to imply that the Italians in Italian Somaliland and during the war years in British Somaliland, simply threw a switch and produced irredentism. However in large measure it was culture contact which re-oriented Somali nationalism, toward the relationship of land for the state rather than the people of the nation. The fact that the Ogaden and other lands claimed by the Somalis were retained under the British and later Italian trusteeship did nothing to dispel the idea of Greater Somalia.

When cultures meet and synthesize, there are obviously a myriad of factors and aspects which must be considered capable of influencing the outcome. Given the complexity of the situation on the Horn many of the factors which may be considered important, even crucial, may have been omitted. But as with other situations, the impact of the Italians on the Horn is a matter of perspective, from where one views the situation, so that what is beneficial from one point of view, can be a disaster from another. The significance of the Italian influence appears to be profound in three areas:

- o The creation of an economic infrastructure and agricultural modernization;

- o The consequences of the reprisals and executions during the occupation;
- o The exacerbation of existing cleavages in Eritrea and Somalia and the subsequent foundation for the twin Somali disputes which trouble the Horn today.

The tremendous capital investment that Italy made in what she hoped would be her future empire has been discussed, an empire of demographic colonization with a million Italians settled on its most fertile land. Of course the liberation of the country by the allies saw much of the infrastructure destroyed or damaged. Even so, it is indisputable that much of the development survived the war and provided the emperor with a start on modernization. The exposure of the population to modern agricultural techniques also would prove to be advantageous to the emperor's modernization plan. For the first time the Ethiopians began to understand the need to move into the modern world in some sectors of life in order to compete as an independent nation. The impact of this aspect of Italian influence was especially hard hitting in Eritrea, which experienced it the longest and had acquired the most extensive infrastructure.

The reprisals and executions had tremendous impact on Ethiopian society and development, though in both an advantageous and at the same time a debilitating and disruptive way. On the plus side the systematic elimination of the Amhara nobility destroyed the traditional feudal hierarchy that existed before the war. Many of the Rases who opposed the emperor's desires were gone. Concurrently with the downfall of the old Rases a new group of nobility rose from the patriot forces of the Abannoch. Not quite as conservative as the old Rases but not quite as radical as the students who followed them, nevertheless a strong and respected group which made the emperor's task after the war easier than it might have been. For example, the establishment of a

national army, central control of policy and justice, public health and other government functions. All would have been opposed by the old as being threats to their power. Admittedly these innovations may not have been as effective or efficient as possible because they do not have roots in the society, but it is a fact that the Italians plowed the ground for the planting of the seeds from which many of the institutions have taken roots.

On the negative side the execution of the cream of Ethiopia's educated youth was a tragedy in more ways than one. Practically every educated man was shot in 1937. A generation of potential leaders was destroyed, a generation that might have provided a line of communication between the other generation and the students clamoring for change in 1974. They might have been the colonels who had the respect and confidence of the junior officers. They might have been the advisors who could have helped the emperor meet the expectations of his people. Sadly, no one knows what might have been.

The pro-Moslem anti-Amhara stance adopted during the occupation of Ethiopia had far-reaching effects. The treatment of Eritrea and Somalia as favored provinces during the occupation further widened cleavages. But it was the idea of autonomy and economic advantage which lured the Eritreans and the Somalis into supporting the Italians. Neither Somalia nor Eritrea suffered the devastation of the campaign or the reprisals of Graziani. The promise of Greater Somalia and an independent Eritrea was the concept which reoriented the thinking of the inhabitants towards specific territory (ies) and contributed most to the conflict which exists today.

ENDNOTES

1. Kaplan, et al, Area Handbook for Somalia, p. 159.
2. Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 147-164, Hailie Sallasie's Rise to Power.

3. Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 220-248, Abannoch Account During the Occupation.

4. Angelo, Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941, p. 225.

CHAPTER V

ETHIOPIA INTERNATIONAL SCENE

On 31 January 1942, the first Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was reached after the Liberation of the Ethiopian state. However the Ogaden and the former colony of Eritrea, as well as British and Italian Somaliland were held in trust by the British until after the war. Many of the ideas regarding nationalism and irridentism implanted by the Italians were to germinate under the British rule. After the war Haile Selassie was faced with widespread unrest and rebels were motivated by a desire to form their own petty kingdoms, others were simply bandits, but a significant few were questioning the right of Haile Selassie to rule. By not following the example of Menelik's victory over the Italians and worse yet, not dying in defeat as did Tewdoros and Johannes he had forfeited his right to the throne.¹

By conquest and cooperation the emperor emerged victorious over the majority of the dissidents. In the early 1950s he was once again firmly in control, his main strengths and at the same time his greatest weaknesses were a powerful monarchy, which rested on a tradition deeply rooted in a national church and Ethiopian ethnic diversity with its deep social cleavages. Supported by a large and relatively democratic army and surrounded by nobles and bureaucrats who were personally obligated to the monarch for their status, the emperor was committed to a process of modernization but only insofar as it enhanced his personal power and prestige. Much of the wherewithal to conduct his modernization program came from the West, and like Ataturk he saw his country's destiny in that direction.

In 1951 the United States replaced the British as Ethiopias principal supplier of arms and training, and a large aid program was established. A Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) was established in Addis Ababa

in 1952. The quid pro quo for the assistance was twofold, first participation in the Korean Conflict and second the establishment of a communications centre. The emperor's response to the former was to send troops in support of the United Nation's resolution on Korea. The United States established a highly classified communications centre at Kagnev near the city of Asmara. The station served the United States interests in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. With the advent of satellite technology the post became less important and the strength shrank from 1,000 to less than ten men and eventually closed down.

Haile Selassie by this time had gained an international reputation as ruler of the oldest independent nation in Africa and could become the international spokesman for the continent. Ethiopia participated in the Bandung Conference and in the 1958 Accra Conference of Independent African States. In the same year the United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa was established in Addis Ababa. The emperor was the key in the preparation and establishment of the organization of Africa unity in 1963.

THE FIRST COUP IN ETHIOPIA

In December 1960 with the Emperor in Brazil the commander of the imperial body guards and his brother, the then Governor of Jigjiga, attempted to lead some dissatisfied Amharas in a coup d'etat to depose the emperor and install a progressive regime. This lasted only for three days, and claimed more than 2,000 lives including close relatives and advisors of the emperor. The regular army, acting on emperor's orders crushed the revolt and the ringleaders. The emperor's control after the coup attempt was still strong. He demonstrated this by making no move to recall the 2,500 body guard troops on duty with the United Nations during the Congo Crisis. The force

contribution to the United Nations was viewed by some quarters as a sign of international prestige. The troops were to remain until 1964. Concurrently the emperor was dealing effectively with the threat of war with Somalia in the South and the Eritrean rebellion in the North. The Eritrean situation is very critical to Ethiopia. The emperor saw the danger of Ethiopia's dependence on the railroad to Djibouti and the Red Sea. The other ports are Assab and Massawa, which are in Eritrea.² The events leading up to the absorption of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1963 will not be discussed here, but suffice it to say that an immediate Eritrean resistance to the Ethiopian rule took the form of armed struggle. The emperor maintained control of Ethiopia for thirty years though he was unable to quell the rebellion in the North. Even the present regime in Addis Ababa has not been able to control Eritrea to date as shall be seen.

The situation in the Ogaden region was also heating up. The Somali nationalism fostered by the Italians had taken root. They were trying to force their claims to the Ogaden and the Kenyan Northern Frontier District, now the Northern Eastern Province. After a series of bloody border clashes in 1960-1967 in which the Ethiopians were the winners, the conflict cooled down.

THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

By 1974 Ethiopia was ready to explode in any direction. As it turned out, the armed forces took up the control of the country. The reasons for this act were explained as follows:

- o Discontent with the pace of modernization.
- o Discontent with the conduct of war in Eritrea.
- o The emperor's inability to deal with major famine which was raging in the northern part of the country.

In early 1974 the military was in control of the government. A coordinating committee was established with both officers and soldiers elected to represent the whole of the armed forces. By September, 1974 the famous DERGUE as the committee came to be known deposed the emperor and assumed full control.³ The question of assassinations and executions which came about as a result of infighting for power within the members of the DERGUE will not be discussed here, but it is sufficient to know that the Marxist elements were able to consolidate power and eliminate the conservative and moderate elements in the group.

ENDNOTES

1. Greenfield, Ethiopia, pp. 270-312, Immediate after WWII.
2. Kaplan, et al, Area Handbook for Ethiopia, p. 65.
3. Blair Thomson, Ethiopia, The Country That Cut Off It's Lead.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOVIET UNION

By 1977 the United States found it compromising to supply arms to an increasingly Marxist and repressive regime. The MAAG was ordered out of the country in May 1977. By June 1977 the whole of the United States Mission closed down in Ethiopia. At this point it is important to recall that Ethiopia was critically dependent on the Fraco-Ethiopia Railway to the port of Djibouti and overland routes to the port of Assab and Massawa, both in Eritrea. These three ports are her only links to the sea and the rest of the world (see Map 3, Annex C). The two access routes to the sea in Eritrea have been arenas of conflict in recent days. The Somali uprising in the Ogaden normally tends to disrupt the link to Djibouti. The Arab backed secessionist war in Eritrea appeared to be on the verge of success. Apart from this the country had to deal with other organized revolts in other parts of the country. (Oromo Liberation Front, Ethiopian Democratic Union, Gojam and Begemidir). Faced with the departure at their own request of their only arms supplier, the Dergue increased its Marxist orientation and began to appeal for Soviet assistance in the ongoing problems. The Soviets were now at a crossroads, a dilemma. Although they had been trying to enter Ethiopia since 1945, the emperor had all the time turned them down in favor of the United States. The major problem for the Soviets was how to continue their relationship with Somalia which had grown to great heights while supporting the Somali number one enemy.

From my own assessment it would appear that the Soviets apparently saw the lessening requirement for Kagnaw Station and the concurrent withdrawal of U.S. personnel as a weakness rather than a normal practice of closing a base in an area no longer vital for U.S. interests. They saw it as a great achievement

in countering the United States involvement in the Horn, but at this point it was not quite clear whether the United States had any real interest in this area. The reversement of the Soviets had been expensive. They supplied billions in arms to Ethiopia and sacrificed a key facility in Somali.

CHAPTER VII

SOMALIA IRREDENTISM

The Somalis are largely pastoral people of nearly five million. An estimated three million live within the borders of the Somali Democratic Republic. The remaining over one million are settled or lead nomadic existences in area claimed by Somalia in Ethiopia, Kenya, (Ogaden, and Northern Frontier District of Kenya) and Djibouti. This becomes an important point that deeply affects the Somalis in an ideology of irredentism with its roots in a traditional Moslem nationalism and the Italian colonial experience. One must understand this factor in order to fully understand Somali objectives. Prior to colonization in the mid 19th Century, the Somalis were divided into nomadic clans which roamed the Horn of Africa with their herds. Their only concession to authority was to Islam and in the 16th Century to Ahmed Gran. The modern history of the country may be said to have begun in late 19th Century when the British and Italians began their slow colonization of the Somali coast.

At the end of World War II the British took the Administration of all of the present day Somalia as well as parts of Ethiopia. However in 1949 the United Nations placed the colony of Italian Somaliland under trusteeship to Italy. The Italian trust territory made excellent progress towards self-government and in 1960 the British and Italian trusteeship were granted independence. They joined together to make the Somali Republic on 1 July 1960. The new nation formed a government on the western model and adopted a blue flag with a white five pointed star. Each point on the star represents an area occupied by Somalis. The Somalis say two of the five are so far independent, right from the out set the government adopted a policy completely opposite that of most African nations; a policy of expansion of the state to

fully encompass the Somali speaking people living in the other states within the Horn region.¹ (See Map 4, Annex D).

THE SOVIET ENTRY AND THE 1969 COUP

In 1963 the domestic pressure to regain the lost territories began to increase and the Somalis sought more foreign aid. The countries approached were the United States, West Germany and Italy. However these countries offered some 18 million dollars worth of small arms and transportation in order not to offend Ethiopia, further more the offer was provided on condition that Somalia would not accept or receive arms from any other source. This was an opportunity for the Soviets. A military deal worth 30 million dollars of equipment and an expansion program of the Somali Army up to 20,000 men was immediately concluded. By 1966 over 600 Somalis were undergoing military training in the Soviet Union and a 250 men Soviet mission was operating in Somalia. The reluctance of bordering states to cede territory led to actual conflict with Ethiopia and Kenya in 1964. Periodic confrontation occurred with fair regularity along both borders. This irredentist policy was pursued with varying degrees of military force albeit without success until 1967.

In that year the government adopted a new policy. Detente with Ethiopia and Kenya and a decision to seek peaceful settlement of Somali claims to the missing territories was the name for the new game. With the absence of an external threat to provide stimulus for national solidarity, a re-emergence of small group particularism among the lineage groups and clans began to erode the government. On 15 October 1969, the President of the Republic was assassinated. When it became apparent that there would be no real change in the government with the selection of a successor, the army decided to act. In a bloodless coup on 21 October 1969 Major General Siad Barre led the army in

seizing control. The state was to be governed by a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). The SRC announced that it would honor all previous commitments, and would support national liberation movements worldwide and the country would be known as the Somali Democratic Republic.²

Siad quickly assumed control of the SRC and its policies and programs. Under his direction, the regime spent its first year in an intense program to gain control of the people. He believed that with change the country was doomed to political anarchy and economic stagnation. He saw the people as the key then as he does now, and he set about to change the society of Somalia. He announced to his people and the world that henceforth Somalia would adopt scientific socialism as its orbit of reference. He recognized that he was faced with poverty, climatological uncertainties, limited natural resources, lack of infrastructure, and a turbulent nomadic population. He also recognized the strong sense of national identity and traditional self-reliance of the Somalis as a valuable asset to his plan. Somalia's development campaign rested on policies and programs that were felt necessary to modify the factors which impeded her development. Siad had been successful in modifying the government and established control with the SRC and was able to carefully lay his plans for the restructuring of the Somali society. He identified three of those programs as crucial.

- o The mobilization of the people in support of government policy, the ultimate goal of which remained the establishment of Greater Somalia.

- o A literacy program including the development of a written form of the Somali language. The complete literalization of the population would follow. He saw this as the first step in politicization of the people.

o A long range 15 year resettlement program encompassing land reform and reclamation, command farming and the winning over of the nomadic population to agriculture.

The completion of the above three programs would in his plan lay the bases for industrialization and movement in to the modern world. It would also of course, provide a viable social-economic core to which the missing territories might be attached.³

And all that was required was foreign aid to support these programs. Although the Soviets had provided support since before the coup, the extent of the involvement did not appreciably increase until 1971. During the same period the United States and West Germany were still operating some aid missions in Somalia and providing other except military oriented ones. The Somalia's merchant fleet was doing trade with North Vietnam. In 1971 the aid allocations for Somalia were tied to the cessation of the trade with North Vietnam, the Somalis rejected what they saw as blackmail and the United States mission was withdrawn.⁴ The Soviets were only too happy to increase the extent of their growing interest in the Indian Ocean and Africa.

In 1974 Siad Barre started very well with his programs succeeding. Somalia joined the Arab League and became the twentieth member. Her ties with the western world seemed to be improving with contacts being developed with Italy and the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Russians as well as the Chinese were actively courting her friendship. All that was lacking was rain. Since 1969 Somalia had not had a year of normal rainfall, and by mid 1974 it became apparent that the traditional Somalia the land of sheiks and warriors had come to the end of the road. By January 1975 the government had stripped its foreign exchange reserves, plunged 105 million dollars into a balance of payment deficit and had shelved ongoing programs in a literal do or die battle against the worst drought the country had ever seen. With over

half of the Somalia's livestock dead from lack of water, over 250,000 nomadic tribesmen came to resettlement camps and relief centres seeking aid and a new life. The old life had died of thirst. In the long run the drought benefited the SRC programs by depriving the nomads of the option to return to the old life without reflecting adversely on the SRC. But the short run impact was bankruptcy of the country. The SRC did everything it could with all it had, yet the means available to it were small.

To add insult to injury, in February 1974 the relatively stable empire of Ethiopia began to crumble. The Somalis began to see an irrational and radical government at the head of the traditional enemy. In the Somali eyes this western supported military government was a threat to the Somalis who inhabited the Ogaden. The conflicting claims of both nations to the French held territory of Afars and Issas (now Djibouti) with its Port of Djibouti also loomed large as a potential Causus Belli. Prudence dictated that Somalia prepare for the worst. Appeals for drought relief were met by a number of countries and sources. The United Nations World Food Program, EEC and the United States, all provided foodstuffs. The response of the Arab League was disappointing, only Libya responded. The greatest support however came from the Soviet Union. The exact amount of money is not known but large numbers of personnel and equipment as well as large amounts of supplies were furnished to the Somalis. The aid from the Soviets made the government capable of handling domestic problems generated by the drought, but the military problem was still unsolved.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION

In July 1974 President Podgorny of the Soviet Union visited Somalia and the two nations signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which included

a substantial increase in military assistance. The Soviets had long been the sole arms supplier and primary aid donor to the Somalis, but this treaty had the effect of formalizing an alliance and to many observers place the Somalis irrevocably in the Soviet Camp. Between 1974 and early 1975 Soviet influence in Somalia approached domination. By 1975 the original small scale military training programs had increased tremendously in size and scope. The intransigence of the West in 1963 and again in 1971 had left Somalia with no choice but the Soviets.

During the period between 1971 to 1976 Soviet Military Aid to Somalia--132 million dollars exceeded that of any other African country except Egypt, Algeria and Guinea. In addition to training programs, the Soviets had made Somalia's army the fourth strongest and only fully mechanized army on the continent. The air force was armed with modern IGs. The only drawback, from a Somali point of view, was that the armed forces were totally dependent on the Soviet Union for fuel and spare parts. If one considers that in addition to all this, the Soviet Union was also the main trading partner for Somalia, and that it has been estimated that Somalia was dependent on the Soviets for 64 percent of her national budget, perhaps domination is not a strong enough word. However, Siad Barre insisted that Somalia was not a Soviet satellite, that the Russians had made no demands, and that they were nothing more than friends whose only desire was to help the Somalis. But the presence of the Soviet naval facility in Berbera on Somali soil, and an estimated 3,000 Soviet and Cuban technicians in early 1977 seemed to give the lie to Siad's pronouncement. The fact of the matter was that the Soviets (and the rest of the world) felt that they had gained an economic stranglehold on Somalia. They perceived their control to be enhanced by the fact that the army was logistically dependent on the Soviet Union. The exception to this view was

Saudi Arabians who began attempting to woo Somalia towards a more nonaligned path.

ENDNOTES

1. Basil Davidson, Somalia in 1975 - The Five Areas are Former British and Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia's Ogaden Region, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and Djibouti, p. 20.

2. I. M. Lewis, The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup.

3. Ibid., p. 403.

4. Lewis, Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa, p. 24.

CHAPTER VIII
SOVIET INVITATION BY ETHIOPIA

In March 1977 and possibly earlier the Soviet Union was invited to help the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia in its struggle with reactionary and counter-revolutionary movements. It is alleged that the Soviets agreed to provide a military aid program of 500 million dollars. In April the Dergue demanded that the United States Military Advisory Group be withdrawn as has been discussed earlier on. Although the Soviets did not openly throw their full weight behind the Ethiopians at this point, Siad Barre and the Somali people began to express concern for their interest in the Ogaden. In May 1977 Siad began to criticize publicly the Soviets at the same time the Cubans started arriving in Addis Ababa. Somali protests were to no avail since in June the Dergue had directed the expulsion of the United States defense attache and demanded the reduction in American presence. The Soviets could not resist the temptation to fill the vacuum. In supporting Ethiopia the Soviets misjudged the reaction of the Somalis. The Somalis were not interested in the same goals as the Soviets, i.e. their only interest was the lost territories. In July 1977 the Somalis living in Ogaden (Ethiopia) began their own war of liberation, and the SRC began supporting them with both arms and troops.

The Soviet reaction was to halt arms shipments to Somalia and increased assistance to Ethiopia. Siad Barre visited Moscow in August to try to resolve the situation but apparently failed. On his return he began to pay close attention to Saudi, Iranian, and U.S. comments and veiled offers of aid. The payoff came on 15 November 1977 when the unthinkable happened. The Soviet Union and Cuba were directed to terminate their military presence (diplomatic as well for the Cubans). The Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation was abrogated and the Soviets and Cubans moved their camp to Ethiopia.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

Until recently the ties between the Soviet Union and Somalia were balanced by the United States ties to Ethiopia. The French (who controlled Djibouti until 1977) followed the wind to ensure the balance held steady. That balance has now changed dramatically and has forced a reassessment of interests on the Horn and cannot fail to have some impact on foreign policies of the actors towards Africa, and the rest of the world. The following pages will try to examine the national interests of the actors on the Horn of Africa. What are the national interests, and how and why do they change. The question is often asked and rarely answered satisfactorily.

The national interest is one of the most frequently invoked criteria by which policymakers attempt to formulate policies. This concept is generally admitted to be an illusive one, having both fixed and variable content. The fixed and irreducible content would normally include the preservation of the nation as an independent political community. The variable content is a function of myriad factors. The traditional mythos or set of ideas, the differing political philosophies of rival political parties, international conditions, contemporary trends in public opinion, the impact of changing technology and so forth.¹

The examination of the paramount objective of the actors on the Horn will only address what appears to be the most salient variables and of necessity will concentrate on the main actors. Threaded throughout the discussion will be comments on the strategic value of the area, the impact of technology on its cultures and the situational factors. Much of the analysis will be colored by personal observations and experiences encountered by the author as a national of one of the countries on the Horn.

ENDNOTES

1. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Theories of International Relations, p. 321.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNITED STATES

The United States had substantial interests on the Horn at one time as has been described earlier in this paper. The need for allies during the Korean War, the requirement for a communication site at Kagnev Station and the need to deploy weapons systems in the Indian Ocean all militated towards involvement in the Horn. As time passed the concern for a resupply route to Israel, an unwillingness to cut off the emperor (the oldest ally in Africa) and the affection and admiration that most Americans felt for brave Ethiopia were instrumental in maintaining the view that the United States had vital national interests in the area. Most significant of all and perhaps the only real reason for continued U.S. interest, was the perception of spreading Soviet influence and the desire to contain it. The United States had no treaties, no real economic interests and no strong cultural ties with any of the countries on the Horn. It appears that the ability of the United States to face the Soviets in the Indian Ocean in a naval sense is more than sufficient at the present time. Certainly the countries of the Horn do not pose a threat to the survival of the United States. Some would cite the importance to Israel of free movement through the Red Sea as a reason for remaining deeply involved in the Horn. The Israelis should be or are able to sufficiently stock enough fuel to last for any conceivable conventional war in the Middle East. By the time their stocks run down, it seems logical to conclude that the superpowers would be involved, if not actually engaged, and at that point the Red Sea routes would become a rather low priority issue. Given the above, does the United States have a national interest in the Horn of Africa?

It would appear that the answer is yes. The interest is not so much in the countries of the Horn but with the ability of actors (particularly the Soviets) and the events on the Horn to influence other parts of the globe where the United States have vital interests, e.g. Southern Africa, the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. The ability of the Soviets to use the Horn as a springboard for projecting power elsewhere in the region is the vital concern. It should be apparent at this point that United States national interests in the region, once satellites had effectively replaced the Kagnaw Station facility, have been limited to reactions to Soviet initiatives and vaguely worded references to stability in the area. Soviet interests seem to be another matter and insofar as U.S. interests seem to be directly related to Soviet action, it is necessary to examine the goals of the Soviet Union.¹

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Farer, Warclouds on the Horn of Africa. p. 138, Declining U.S. Interest.

CHAPTER X

THE SOVIET UNION

The commonly known Soviet Union goals on the Horn can be summarized as three:

- o To provide a counterweight to U.S. influence in the area.
- o To develop the capability of projecting Soviet power, in peace and war, into the African Continent and the Indian Ocean.
- o To support and assist those nations who have chosen to follow the Marxist path, e.g. to live up to the Soviet ideological commitments.

COUNTER U.S. INFLUENCE

It has been related in the previous paragraphs that the Soviets had successfully countered U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa, but at this point it was questionable whether or not the United States had any real desire to remain on the ground in what was beginning to look like a no-win situation.

PROJECTION OF POWER

Most opinions of Soviet intentions on the Horn prior to 1977 tended to stress the facilities formerly held by the Soviets in Somalia as the key to U.S.-Soviet naval competition in the area. A closer examination results in a somewhat different conclusion. "Western facilities in the Indian Ocean all together are more than that of the Soviets."¹ The statement would seem to support the idea that in time of major conventional conflict that western naval power could be deployed in the Indian Ocean without major problems. In the case of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean will probably not be a threat of major importance.

What then is the relationship between the Horn and the Soviet's objectives in the Indian Ocean?

It is important to note that since 1968 the Soviet Union has deployed a relatively small number of combatant vessels in the Indian Ocean. The number rarely exceeds ten except during regional crises. Examples of increased strength occurred during the war between India and Pakistan and during the Middle East Conflict in 1973.² It appears qualitatively and quantitatively that Russian naval activity in the area is directed towards maintaining a small force which can be rapidly enlarged during times of crises or tensions. Some analysts feel that Soviet reinforcement above the normal small fleet has been in response to U.S. deployments into the region, rather than an attempt to influence littoral states during crises. Soviet anchorages and facilities are maintained at a number of locations on the Indian Ocean or its two major appendages, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean can be assessed as being of five military and three political which are:

- o Military

- oo Interdiction of enemy shipping in time of war or crises.

- The Russians are positioning the naval force to enable them to interfere with the shipment of oil from the Persian Gulf. This capability would subject the western Europe allies to the mercy of the Soviet Union because most of these countries depend on Persian Gulf petroleum. For their industries and homes and in some cases nearly their entire economics. The same vulnerability threatens American's most important East Asian ally Japan.³

- oo Protection of Soviet merchant and fishing vessels.

- The Indian Ocean has come to figure prominently in Soviet economic calculations. The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is indicative of Russian's growing economic ties with the region. These commercial and trade relations with the Indian Ocean countries necessitate a show of Soviet presence in the waters. The Indian Ocean Sea Lanes, that is a secure and steady access to them, have

become important part of the Soviet Union's Indian Ocean configurations.⁴

oo Ensuring Lines of Communications. The geographic necessity to maintain the lines of communications between the European and East Asia parts of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Navy is divided into four fleet areas. The Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific areas. Assured connection between the three European fleets and the Pacific fleet can only be maintained through the Indian Ocean.⁵

oo Denial to the Naval Forces of the West. Even if the American nuclear submarine deployments were minimal, the Indian Ocean does indeed constitute a logical area for the deployment.

While it is true that the USSR does not currently possess the ability to locate and destroy enemy nuclear submarines and that the Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean do not currently constitute an antisubmarine strike force, it may be assumed that Moscow is hard at work in an effort to develop such capabilities. In the meantime the Soviets are busy in the Indian Ocean laying the necessary ground work to maintain such a capability.⁶

oo Intervention in Local Conflicts in Support of Liberation Movements.

From a Soviet point of view an overseas capability by the negative acts of confronting, preventing, and replacing western intervention, has enabled revolutionary forces to perform what is regarded as their historical function.⁷

o Political

oo Influence and Prestige. To show the flag has been a time honored device to increase influence and prestige.

To demonstrate its naval strength in a manner consistent with international law and established practices, the Soviet Union undertook to advertise its superpower status by a naval presence in waters which prior to the mid sixties did not see Soviet naval vessels.⁸

oo Internationalist Mission. The navy as a political actor.

The Soviet fleet's current importance as a foreign policy

instrument is not only a function of its application in periods of international tension. Since 1969 the political strategy governing the use of the military forces has shifted from defense to offense. The change in strategy has led to greater naval activism in promoting as well as defending Soviet global interests.⁹

In this sense it is suggested that the Soviet Navy is not only an instrument of policy but the object of policy as well.

oo Political Containment of China. The Soviet naval presence serves as a political sedative to assure these Indian Ocean littoral countries of Moscow's countervailing strength.

Chinese negotiators, advisors, or trainers are often preferred to those of the Soviet Union, but China is unable to master a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it cannot match the effect of Soviet warships in the harbors of the region.¹⁰

It seems that the broad strategic requirements of the Soviet Union are to protect economic interests in the region and to maintain a naval force which undercuts Chinese penetration, and opposes if necessary American missile threats. At the same time the Soviets are more than willing to take advantage of the political spin off that such presence gains in terms of political leverage, prestige, and influence among littoral states. Is the Horn of Africa critical to attainment of the Soviet Union's Indian Ocean objective? To put it in another way, would the loss of the Horn by the Soviet's result in their inability to attain those objectives? To answer this question an evaluation of the importance of the Horn of Africa to each identified objective will be made.

DISCUSSION

o Military

oo Interdiction - The geographic importance of the Horn of Africa relates to the route through the Red Sea, not the cape routes. In time of war

or crises the Red Sea-Suez Canal route would be unusable, through either Soviet action or through NATO action or friendly nation's action to seal off the Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Any attempt to interfere with the oil routes in a crisis situation could lead to rapid escalation of tension and to conflict between the West and the Soviet Union which would render the oil routes irrelevant. In any case Soviet facilities at Hodeida and Basra Uai duassar are adequate, and probably better located for interdiction missions. The Horn is not critical to attainment of this objective.

oo Protection - The Horn's location is well suited for this mission in normal times. Soviet activity through the Red Sea and Suez can be protected by ships operating out of ports on the Horn. During wartime, however, for reasons mentioned above the utility of bases on the Horn declines. It would seem that if the Soviets can protect their merchant and fishing fleets in other distant waters without benefit of land support facilities, they can do the same in the Indian Ocean. That they have done in the past prior to 1975, indicates that the Horn is not critical in attaining this objective.

oo Ensuring - Having stressed the strategic advantage of the Indian Ocean to the Soviets as a link between their fleets, it would seem compelling that control of the Horn is critical to ensuring lines of communication. Thoughtful reflection, however, gives the lie to that assumption. The Suez-Red Sea route cannot be defended or maintained in time of war. One ship sunk in the Suez Canal closes off the choke point. At best this route provides the Soviets with a means for rapidly deploying forces in time of peace and low tension. Any attempt to force the canal would result in the escalation of conflict and probable closure of the water way. The Horn is important to this objective in time of peace but not relevant in times of hostility or tension.

oo Denial - Given the rapid improvement in weapons technology, this objective is no longer valid. Weaponry no longer requires that the Indian Ocean be used as a launch area for ballistic missiles directed at the Soviet Union. If denial is an objective, it is political, not military in nature. Soviet control of the Horn in a nuclear war scenario would not appreciably affect the outcome, primarily because of the negative effects mentioned above on Soviet ability to reinforce Indian Ocean forces during periods of increased tension that would probably precede a nuclear war.

oo Intervention - Of all the military objectives identified, the ability to intervene in support of liberation movement is the most relevant to the Horn of Africa. The Horn itself is an example of that intervention. If the Soviet intentions are to intervene in African disputes, the Horn of Africa is critical from a geographic view. The same rationale applies to involvement in potential conflicts on the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East. However, no appreciable strategic advantage is gained in influence over events in littoral countries to the East of the Horn. The Soviets have the capability to project power southward into India, Pakistan, Burma, etc. without reliance on facilities in the Horn. The Horn is critical to intervention in Africa but not of significance to intervention in Indian Ocean states. The relevance of the Horn of Africa to Soviet military objectives in the Indian Ocean appears to be tenuous indeed. The political relevance is more pronounced.

o Political

oo Influence and Prestige - The Soviet expulsion from Somalia, particularly after similar occurrences in Egypt and Sudan, requires that the Soviets retain a hold on the Horn or risk losing credibility, not only in the Indian Ocean, but throughout the Third World. For a superpower to be pushed around by a country of just a few million souls is intolerable and some

redress must be obtained. Thus, a Soviet success on the Horn, i.e. control of Ethiopia is imperative to Soviet maintenance of influence and prestige in the Indian Ocean, Africa and throughout the Third World.

oo The Navy as a Political Element of Power - For the Soviet Navy particularly the expulsion from their only base in the Indian Ocean must have been galling. Much of the Soviet effort on the Horn has undoubtedly been at the urging of naval policymakers in the Kremlin. The navy would view the loss of the Horn much as many view the United States military experience in Vietnam and with serious repercussions within the Soviet leadership. If the Soviet Navy is to continue as a political actor control of the Horn is critical.

oo Political Containment.

ooo Although not bearing directly on Sino-Soviet affairs, the Horn of Africa affords the Soviets a secure base, well outside the influence of Peking, from which to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean. The Horn has also been an area of contested influence with both Somalis and Ethiopia reacting favorably to Chinese initiatives. Of perhaps more importance, the Horn again can act as a springboard from which to counter Chinese involvement in African nations to the South, i.e. Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. Although not critical to Indian Ocean objectives, a defeat on the Horn by the Chinese would bode ill for Soviet influence in Africa and the Indian Ocean.

ooo It appears that the Horn of Africa is only peripherally important to the Soviet Union in the attainment of her Indian Ocean objectives. Although Soviet control of the Horn facilitates, achieving such objectives, loss of the Horn in both political and military contexts would not negate attaining those goals. It would seem that the linkage between the Horn of Africa and Soviet objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East are of

more significance. It appears the Soviets feel that way as well; at any rate it is difficult to come up with another reason for their gambling a \$100 million naval facility in Berbera in order to gain entry into a country that could be landlocked in the event of further conflicts in the area.

oo Ideological Commitment

ooo The Soviets have already been accused of using ideology as a rationalization after the fact in foreign policy decisions. This may have been the case in Somalia and Ethiopia. The manner in which the Soviets developed the perception of a client state in Somalia has been discussed. It appeared in 1976 that Somalia could make no move without Soviet concurrence. At the same time Ethiopia's revolution was seen to shift from one oriented on social reform to an ultra-Marxist and repressive regime.

ooo Although the Soviets did not immediately back the Ethiopians, Siad Barre saw the writing on the wall and began to criticize Soviet actions. This was unsuccessful as by June the Dergue had directed the expulsion of the Americans as mentioned earlier. The Soviets could not resist the invitation and the temptation to fill the vacuum. It may be argued that they did so on purely abstract grounds, but Ethiopia is more capable of supporting itself than Somalia. The prestige of Ethiopia has been greater than that Somalia's in the view of other African and Third World countries. Yet in the final analysis, it is a defensible argument that they moved in because they were obliged to do so. Wars of Liberation must be supported.

ooo Without a doubt the Soviets must have felt capable of managing their Somali clients, regardless of their actions towards Ethiopia. After all didn't they both share the same goals? The answer was no. The Somalis were not interested in the spread of an ideology, that was a Soviet concern. The

Somalis wanted the missing territories. The western Somali Liberation Front began their own war of the liberation in the Ogaden.

ooo The Soviets responded by increasing aid to the Ethiopians. Talks with Podgorny and Castro convinced Siad Barre that Somali goals would have to wait so he began talking to the Saudis and the West. Soviets insensitivity to popular demands and aspirations and perhaps a bit too much opportunism resulted in their expulsion from Somalia.

ooo In their quest for satisfaction of their three goals on the Horn, the Soviets have not done well. They have countered the United States involvement in the area at a time when U.S. interests seemed to be at its lowest ebb in years. They have not yet increased their capability for projecting Soviet power into the region (except for assistance direct to Ethiopia). Indeed they have accomplished the opposite. The loss of facilities in Somalia has probably limited their capability in this regard and cannot be truly offset until a solution is reached in the Eritrean situation. They have achieved an ideological success in Ethiopia, but have suffered a serious reverse in Somalia.

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Farer, Statement - Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa, pp. 138-140.

2. Dale R. Tahtinen assisted by John Lenczowski, Arms in Indian Ocean Interests and Challenges, p. 17.

3. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

4. Bezboruah, U.S. Strategy, p. 132.

5. Ferenc A. Valik, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, pp. 180-181, (Free Press 1976).

6. Gleg M. Smolansky, Soviet Entry Into the Indian Ocean An Analysis, The Indian Ocean, Its Political Economic and Military Importance, pp. 342-343.

7. Geoffery Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, p. 81, University of California Press, 1973.

8. Valik, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 182.

9. Anne M. Kelly, Port Visits and the Internationalist Mission of the Soviet Navy in McGwiren Michael Soviet Naval Influence, Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, p. 511, Preager Publishers, 1977.

10. Valik, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 182.

CHAPTER XI

FRANCE AND DJIBOUTI

"The newest internationally recognized independent nation in Africa, Djibouti is one of the most desolate places on earth."¹ Its principal resources are sand and salt and it is the smallest of the countries on the Horn. Without its port and the railway to Addis Ababa, it would be of absolutely no consequence in affairs on the Horn and probably would have been partitioned between Ethiopia and Somalia long ago. The port and railway were the lifeline for over 50 percent of Ethiopia's imports and exports prior to 1974 and given the situation Eritrea was of obvious importance if not crucial to the Ethiopians. The fact that the preponderant ethnic group in Djibouti is of Somali origin was of some concern to both the major actors on the Horn. The Somalis because of their irredentist orientation and the Ethiopian as a threat. However, as long as the French occupied the territory, the Ethiopians never felt in imminent danger. As a result of that anxiety, alternate port facilities and a highway were built at Assab in Eritrea.

At independence, granted by the French in June 1977, a bilateral agreement provided for the stationing of 4,000 foreign legionnaires in Djibouti to protect the country from any external threat. The French and the new government had successfully satisfied both Somalia and Ethiopia and forestalled a take over by either country. It is unlikely that Djibouti would remain independent if the French were to leave. All this being said, the value of the Port of Djibouti has long been overrated, except as it applies to Ethiopia. The railway to the port has been interdicted by the Somali insurgents in the Ogaden and had it not been for the emperor's foresight in building up Assab, Ethiopia might well be choking to death today. As far as the larger strategic value is conceived, it is just as easy to cover the

approaches to the Red Sea from Berbera in Somalia, a fact the Soviets recognized in 1973. It is however impossible to do so from the middle of Ethiopia, a fact driven home to the Soviets by the events in Somalia. Should Eritrea succeed in her bid for Independence, the value of Djibouti will increase both in Somali and Ethiopian eyes and without French support or presence there is no doubt that violence and annexation attempts would take place.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomson and Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa.

CHAPTER XII

AFRICAN STATES

The instability in the Horn has been a matter of concern to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) since the border conflicts of 1964. The OAU's attempts at mediating the disputes met with some success in the Khartoum Agreement and the Arusha Agreement of mid sixties. The OAU has never wavered from its position on the recognition of initial boundaries and that the issue of Eritrea was purely an internal affair within Ethiopia.

Sudan and Kenya are both affected by events within the Horn and have pursued their own interests. Both countries fear the danger of spillover of conflicts into their own territory and both have expressed concern about the growing Soviet influence in the region.

Sudan

o Sudan has always sympathized with the Eritrean cause and views the Soviet presence as a greater threat to her integrity. Nimeiry's attempts to mediate the escalating Eritrean situation in 1976 were futile because of the intransigence of the Dergue and the growing Soviet influence within that body. Sudanese policies shifted towards open opposition toward the Dergue. It appears that Sudan's objectives are to prevent incursions upon her own territory while limiting Soviet influence in the Horn by encouraging the formation of an autonomous Eritrea state, Muslim if possible.

Kenya

o Kenya views Somalia as her greatest threat. While decrying and fearing increased Soviet presence in the region, she has allowed Moscow's ships to call in at the Port of Mombasa carrying Ethiopian goods. Kenyan paranoia over Somalia's claim to the northern frontier district has led her to attempt to

walk a tight rope. It would seem that Kenya feels capable of balancing the Soviet presence by escalating its own military assistance from Washington and by backing Ethiopia which is seen as the most powerful regional state in the conflict. Kenya follows the OAU line with respect to Eritrea. Kenya may be the most astute of the regional states in the line she has chosen to follow. By its very nature, Ethiopia will always be the dominant nation on the Horn. History has shown that no "occupier" or invader has ever lasted long on the Horn, they are accepted, partially absorbed, but always ultimately expelled. If the cycle repeats itself, Kenya will be in an excellent position.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF

Israel

o The Israeli connection with Ethiopia goes back a long way. The first Israeli consulate was established in the mid fifties. "The Israelis are convinced that the territorial and political stability of Ethiopia was the cornerstone for the stability of the entire area.¹ Haile Selassie exchanged neutrality in the Arab-Israeli Conflict in return for technical and military assistance. However, formal ties between the Ethiopians and the Israelis ended in 1973 as the emperor bowed to Africa pressure, yet informal relations continued until 1977. The conventional wisdom has it that the Israeli interest in Ethiopia is the prevention of Arab hegemony on the Red Sea littoral, i.e. to keep the sea lanes open, but there are other factors as well.

According to Michael Ledden who elucidates them to continue to use Ethiopia as halfway house on the way to Kenya and South Africa, her fear of the Red Sea becoming an Arab Lake, her concern about growing Soviet influence, until recently centered in Somalia and her antagonism to the Eritrean revolt, which was closely linked to the PLO.²

Israeli objectives therefore tend to follow the Kenyan line of dealing with the Somalis (and Eritrean rebels) first, and worry about the Soviets and Cubans later. In no way can Israel ignore Arab victories no matter how remotely connected or how far away. Any Arab success, no matter how small, is a much greater threat to the Israelis than a Soviet presence on the Horn. The Israelis would rather not see a Soviet presence on the Horn of Africa either.

The Arabs and the Gulf

o The Arabs and the Iranians both view events on the Horn as dangerous to long-term security goals in their own camps. With the majority of Arab nations as well as the Iranians involved to a greater or lesser degree in the petroleum industry, the important question is the right of passage in sea lanes. In this regard their major common objective seems to be the preservation of at least a status quo in the Indian Ocean region including the Horn. A second consideration by the two leading powers in the group, Iran and Saudi Arabia, seems to be a recognition that perhaps the United States cannot be depended upon when the chips are down. The major arms build up in the Persian Gulf and on the peninsula could, in parts be traced to these two factors.

Even before the fighting erupted between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Saudis had been courting the regime in Mogadishu in an attempt to wean it away from the Soviet Union. Once fighting broke out Saudi Arabia and other conservative regimes are believed to have served as financial backers for Somalia's war effort in the Ogaden. Much of the aid would only be delivered in the case of an Ethiopian invasion, into Somalia itself and not just the retaking of Ogaden.³

The last sentence is important. In Somalia just as with the aid furnished to the Eritreans by the Arab States, there is just enough furnished to keep the pot boiling, but never enough to allow a decision to be reached by an all-out effort. A fruitful region for further study might be the use of events on the Horn by the Arabs, Israelis or Iranians in order to gain concessions and additional armaments from the West and other suppliers as well as to keep the superpowers in mutual confrontation.

It would seem that the Arabs have an interest in limited Eritrean and Somali success if for no other reason than the discomfiture it would cause to the Israelis. The anti-Soviet attitude of the Arab world in general also

dictates a hostile reaction to the Dergue. The Saudis and the Iranians have their own unique interests as well. To the Iranian it is an Indian Ocean problem and increased Soviet presence anywhere in the region is a matter of grave concern. The Shah's fear of an Iranistanization of his country under the Soviet Union coupled with the unrest within Iran made it imperative that he pursue a policy that opposed radical regimes and Soviet attempts at increasing influence in the region.

The Saudis also oppose the rise of radicalism in the area for fear of its spillover effect. The Saudis also feel a religious obligation to support the predominately Muslim Somalis. In short, economic security considerations and a commitment to traditional rule, as opposed to radical regimes and in the case of the Saudis a religious commitment have prompted Tehran and Riyadh to become leading opponents of Soviet and Ethiopian policies on the Horn.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael A. Ledeen, "The Israeli Connection," The Washington Review, May 1978, p. 49.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 15.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having examined in some detail the regional actors on the Horn of Africa and to some degree the influence, objective, and interests of the external actors, it is appropriate at this point to try to put together the views in order to arrive at some conclusions and recommendations about the state of affairs on the Horn and the direction in which things might be leading. The Horn has been viewed here from three perspectives:

- o Internal aspects
- o Regional linkages and
- o External influences.

Each of the three points of view converge to influence consideration. It is in that fashion that this paragraph will extrapolate from the inferences of this study.

Internal Aspects

o None of the actors on the Horn are so secure that they are immune from internal threats. In fact all five of the states, Ethiopia and Somalia in particular, face potential or actual serious internal problems.

oo Ethiopia

In addition to the western Somali Liberation Front in the South and Eritrean Liberation Front and associated groups in Eritrea, the Dergue is contending with at least four other organized liberation movements. The Soviet assistance coupled with the Cuban presence has enabled the Ethiopians to deal fairly well with the Somali threat, but it does not appear that conclusive success is forthcoming in Eritrea or in the other provinces. The brutal and repressive measures taken by the Dergue coupled with the lack of

any real social change resulting from their policies ensure that armed struggle for independence and freedom from Black colonialism will continue in the Ogaden and Eritrea. As the Dergue continues to lose its credibility with the people and they begin to see the Soviets as simply a new balabat (nobility), dissidence will increase.

oo Somalia

Disaffected Somali Army elements are reportedly not happy with the way things are being carried out by the Central Government. However Siad Buare has always been able to deal with such groups successfully. This reinforces the notion that Somali will support a leader who appears to be effective as long as an external threat exists. In short, even though regimes may change in Somalia, the burning desire to reclaim the lost territories will continue to unite the Somali nation. Economic considerations may generate internal problems, but if the government can continue to receive the foreign aid required to deal with the economic factors, Somalia will probably remain a relatively stable actor on the Horn. A case could be made for a resurgence of small group particularism should the lost territories be recovered and the external threat eliminated thereby. However, that is not a likely occurrence in the middle run due to the external involvement in the neighboring countries.

oo The Other States on the Horn

Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya all have potential problems of internal instability. Djibouti should remain stable as long as the French connection remains and French interest is maintained. Should the French indicate a lack of interest there and should Eritrea continue to be successful in her bid for independence, Djibouti will almost certainly become a causus belli for renewed conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.

The greatest threat to Sudan and Kenya is the spillover effect that could come about as a result of combat in Eritrea and the Ogaden should Ethiopia increase its support of the dissident Ansar group in southern Sudan in an attempt to influence the regional policy of Sudan. A serious threat to the stability of Sudan could result. As long as the differences between Ethiopia and Somalia are kept within their own borders Kenya and Sudan should be capable of maintaining internal stability.

Regional Linkages

o The Horn of Africa represents a mini international system which is essentially bipolar in nature and seeking equilibrium. The factors of geography, religious and social development have combined to create two opposing cultures which are in a struggle for dominance. The Horn is not a simple ideological battleground, nor is it a purely territorial dispute. The roots go deeper to things which are primordial. The factors of race, religion, kinship and custom all weigh heavily in the equation. It can be said with a fair degree of certainty that regional tensions and conflicts will exist on the Horn until equilibrium is achieved, until Eritrea is independent of conquered, and the Somalis gain their lost territories or lose their national identity.

Considering the degree of internal discontent within the nations, the serious economic and social problems which exist and the factors of poverty, raising expectations and an increasing modernization gap, all of which have been exacerbated by the severity of recent droughts and warfare, it is unlikely that the Horn of Africa can overcome the imbalance caused by external actors to achieve that equilibrium in the foreseeable future.

External Influence

o The superpower imposition of ideology upon the already deep and serious primordial cleavages extant on the Horn have accelerated the rate of change. Historically, great events in the region have been precipitated by external actors. The Horn has tended to absorb what it can digest from the intruders, but ultimately rejects the remainder. The Arabs, Portuguese, Italians and most recently the Soviets are examples.

The external actors involved today also contribute to the deepening and in some cases creation of cleavages within the region. If the historical trend holds true the Soviet Union will be no exception and will find that she is a little more than the Horn can effectively digest. In the wake of the Soviet departure there will remain old and new wounds which must be healed if the Horn is ever to achieve it's normal balance.

CHAPTER XV

RECOMMENDATIONS - PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE AND SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT

When all is said and done, the Horn of Africa needs peace in each country and among the countries of the region. What we have seen from the previous paragraphs is an indication that no country has gained from rivalry with its neighbors. Somalia's efforts to reunite the Somali population under Mogadishu rule have benefited nobody, instead they have caused a lot of suffering for the people they were designed to liberate. To date these people have been held hostage in refugee camps. The tension between Ethiopia and Sudan will continue as long as each country sponsors insurgencies in the other's territory, apparently in this case no one claims each other's territory or population and there is no substantial disagreement.

In Ethiopia, the Addis Ababa regime has tried to settle a political problem through military means without success. Rigid methods and efforts to organize a highly varied people into a single authoritarian rule have resulted in many kinds of underground resistance in parts of the country. Even in Somalia where the whole population is essentially homogeneous in language, culture and religion, there are still tribal problems in which the North is alienated from the South.

In the light of the foregoing therefore, my recommendations for the Horn problem are divided into two parts, those which require immediate attention are given under a short-term period from one to five years and those which require more investigations and consultations under a long-term period between five and ten years.

o Short Term

oo The Horn countries need to eliminate human suffering as a matter of great urgency. This is so especially for those people who are held in refugee

camps or those living in areas where normal basic needs are non-existent. These basic needs include food, clean drinking water and medicine. Horn governments which have these cases should cooperate with the free world organizations in order that relief materials may reach those who are in desperate need of them.

- oo Termination of internal violence. This can be achieved through the rule of law, justice and the observation of human rights.

- oo Negotiations with resistance and dissident movements to reach compromise, followed by demobilization of guerilla armies within the Horn countries. This should include restriction of overt arms shipment and withdrawal of financial and material support to separatist or dissident movements.

- oo Implementation and emphasis on economic development in areas hard hit by warfare and drought. These are Eritrea, Ogaden and Southern Sudan.

- o Long Term

- oo The Horn governments should seek aid to promote economic development and incentives for private investment, investment in manpower training, technical research and food production programs as follows:

- oo Existing border issues should be resolved in accordance with and/or under the principles and supervision of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN) and all extraterritorial claims should cease if meaningful peace is to be achieved.

- oo The Horn governments should agree to utilize the OAU/UN to explore initiatives for lasting peace and mediation of disputes.

- oo The Horn countries should identify donor countries and closely work with them to establish strategies for economic development with the emphasis on agriculture which is within the reach of the Horn countries. If these

, strategies are successful, areas of mutual interests should be explored with donor countries to ensure commitment and increased development assistance. This should provide incentives for private investment.

oo Hoping that by this time stability and political maturity has been achieved, citizens of the Horn countries should be allowed to exercise their rights in political and domestic issues.

CHAPTER XVI

SUMMARY

The Horn of Africa can be summarized as an East-West area of competition due to the fact that it offers strategic sea and air points that control the oil rich Persian Gulf and the oil transport route from the Gulf. The Horn is a potential area for staging military intervention or political subversion. It dominates the only two of the West's vital oil arteries, the Indian Ocean/Cape and the Red Sea/Suez Canal routes. The earlier relationships among the Horn, the United States and the Soviet Union have influenced some elements of the population which led to the formation of the current underground and dissident movements that oppose most of the present regimes. This influence is seen in other countries which maintain good relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union because they have rejected the Marxist-Leninist ways of doing business or the democratic practices.

The Soviet Union opportunistically established itself by exploiting western failure to meet the security needs of Somalia and Ethiopia in 1960s and 1970s respectively. The Soviets played a love game of power balance in the region, first by building the Somalia's military power, then taking advantage of the threat it posed to Ethiopia to expand its influence there.

Another point that surfaces in this study is that no one except the Soviets, and perhaps the regime in Addis Ababa, really desires a Soviet presence on the Horn, because no one knows how the Ethiopian military power is likely to be exploited by the Soviets in order that it can further influence events in the region. Given the apparent future course of events in other parts of Africa especially the southern, and the attitude of the Arab World regarding Soviet intentions, it seems likely that the Horn will continue to be a trouble spot in the world. Unless the Horn countries decide to implement

changes in line with my recommendations, or the United States and the Soviet Union agree to cooperate in promoting peace, stability and economic development of the region, this situation will continue. However, the initiative for such moves must originate from the region itself.

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
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
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MAP 1 - ANNEX A



MAP 2 - ANNEX B





MAP 4 - ANNEX D

